Abstract-In this paper, we investigate cooperation of conventional relays and friendly jammers subject to secrecy constraints for cooperative networks. In order to obtain an optimized secrecy rate, the source selects several conventional relays and friendly jammers from the intermediate nodes to assist data transmission, and in return, it needs to make a payment. Each intermediate node here has two possible identities to choose, i.e., to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer, which results in a different impact on the final utility of the intermediate node.
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of physical layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless channel to provide secure communications. The security is quantified by the secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate of reliable information sent from the source to the intended destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. This line of work was pioneered by Aaron Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel and established fundamental results of creating perfectly secure communications without relying on private keys [1] . Follow-up work in [2] the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel was studied, and in [3] Wyner's approach was extended to the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels. Cooperative jamming is considered as a promising approach to improve the secrecy capacity by interfering the eavesdropper with codewords independent of the source messages in a cooperative network. In [4] , [5] , several cooperative jamming schemes were investigated for different scenarios.
Cooperative game theory provides analytical tools to study the behavior of rational players when they cooperate. The main branch of cooperative games describes the formation of cooperating groups of players, referred to as coalitions, which can strengthen the players' positions in a game. Different classes of coalitional games for communication networks are introduced in [6] . Recently, researches on coalitional games used for distributed cooperation to improve the system performance have attracted lots of interest [7] , [8] .
In this paper, we investigate conventional relay and friendly jammer cooperation for secure data transmission in a cooperative network. The source here can be regarded as a buyer who selects a group of several conventional relays and friendly jammers from the intermediate nodes in order to achieve an optimal secrecy rate, and in return it pays for the "service" offered by the selected nodes. Each intermediate node in the network has two identities to choose, i.e., to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer, which is mainly determined according to its own channel conditions to the destination and the eavesdropper. After an intermediate node makes a choice of its identity, it starts to find some optimal partners to strengthen its opportunity to be selected by the source that may lead to a satisfactory payoff.
Specifically, we formulate this cooperation as a coalitional game with transferable utility. Some properties of the game are then studied, from which we find that the disjoint coalitions rather than the grand coalition will form in most cases, i.e., the coalitional game defined here can be classified as a coalition formation game. Furthermore, we define a Max-Pareto order for the value comparison between different coalitions, based on which we employ the merge-and-split rules. Then, we devise a distributed merge-and-split coalition formation algorithm of conventional relays and friendly jammers for the proposed game. Finally, the efficiency of the proposed coalition formation algorithm is verified by simulations. From the simulation results, we can see that the conventional relays and friendly jammers can self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions in a distributed manner and the algorithm achieves an efficient secrecy rate for data transmission.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model of a cooperative network consisting of a couple of intermediate nodes is described. In Section III, we formulate this conventional relay and friendly jammer cooperation as a coalitional game with transferable utility and then study some properties of the proposed game. In Section IV, we construct a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on the merge-and-split rules. Simulation results are provided in Section V and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1 Note that relay R m , m ∈ M, must belong to the decoding subset T D , while friendly jammer J k , k ∈ K, can be any node of the node set T as it need not decode the source messages. Furthermore, we assume that there are no direct links between source and destination as well as between source and eavesdropper. As a result, the data transmission can only be performed through the intermediate nodes, and the eavesdropper cannot overhear the broadcast channels between source and intermediate nodes as the source-eavesdropper channel is blocked. This topology assumption follows the description in [10] .
Suppose the selected relay R m , m ∈ M, transmits with power p R m . The channel gains from relay R m to destination D and malicious eavesdropper E are g Rm,D and g Rm,E , respectively. Friendly jammer J k , k ∈ K, transmits with power p J k to help improve the secrecy rate of data transmission from relay R m to destination D. The channel gains from friendly jammer J k to destination D and eavesdropper E are g J k ,D and g J k ,E , respectively. Note that here the channel gain contains the path loss, as well as the Rayleigh fading coefficient with zero mean and unit variance. For simplicity, we assume that the fading coefficients are constant over one slot, and vary independently from one slot to another. The thermal noise at the destination and eavesdropper nodes satisfies independent Gaussian distribution with zero mean and same variance denoted by σ 2 . The channel bandwidth is W . First, with friendly jammers out of consideration, using maximal-ratio combining (MRC) at receiver, the channel capacity for data transmission from the selected relays to destination D, denoted by C R→D ({R m }), m = 1, 2, . . . , M , can be written as
Similarly, the channel capacity for data leakage from the selected relays to malicious eavesdropper E, denoted by C R→E ({R m }), can be written as
The direct links S → D and S → E are not available in our assumptions, and thus, security of data transmission concerns only the cooperative relaying channels. Then, the secrecy rate for data transmission only via the selected relays can be defined as
where (x) + represents max {x, 0}. Taking friendly jammers into consideration, i.e., with the help of the friendly jammers transmitting jamming signals to interfere the malicious eavesdropper, the channel capacity for data transmission from the selected relays to destination
Note that in our assumptions destination D is not able to mitigate the artificial interference from the friendly jammers, as the jamming signals are unknown to the destination.
Similarly, the channel capacity for data leakage from the selected relays to malicious eavesdropper E, denoted by C R→E ({R m }, {J k }), can be written as
Then, the secrecy rate for data transmission with the help of friendly jammers can be defined as
III. RELAY AND JAMMER COOPERATION AS A COALITIONAL GAME
In this cooperative system, we consider the source as a buyer who wants to send its messages to the corresponding destination and to optimize the secrecy rate of data transmission with the help of conventional relays and friendly jammers, while in return it needs to pay for the "service". However, only one coalition consisting of several conventional relays and friendly jammers from the node set T can be selected by the source for secure data transmission. Thus, there exists competition among the intermediate nodes as each node wants to be selected and gets the payment from the source. The payment is determined by the amount of secrecy rate offered by the selected conventional relays and friendly jammers. Moreover, we assume that the source is sufficiently rich, i.e., the source cares much more about the secrecy rate of data transmission than the payment.
Then, in this section, we formulate the conventional relay and friendly jammer cooperation for secure data transmission described above as a coalitional game. In the proposed coalitional game, there involves a set of players, i.e., the intermediate nodes in the cooperative network, who seek to find optimal partners forming cooperative groups, in order to increase their counters in the selective transmission and to be selected by the source in the end maximizing their utilities.
A. Coalitional Game Definition
We define the intermediate nodes cooperation as a coalitional TU-game (T , v), where T denotes the set of players, i.e., the intermediate nodes
. , T N }, and v(S) is the utility of a coalition S, S ⊆ T . The value v of a coalition S can be given as
where ε r is a switching factor that ε r = 1 when there exists at least one conventional relay in S and ε r = 0 when there is no conventional relay in S. M S and K S represent the number of conventional relays and friendly jammers in the coalition, respectively, satisfying M S + K S = |S|, where |S| denotes the total number of members in the coalition.
Each node in the node set T has two identities to choose, to be a conventional relay or to be a friendly jammer. To choose a proper identity is quite important for an intermediate node, for it has great effects on whether the intermediate node can find optimal partners to form a coalition and to be selected by the source in the end. The source will choose the coalition who can provide the highest secrecy rate for data transmission. Suppose that each intermediate node is selfish and rational, whose objective is to maximize its own utility. We denote by N the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , N }. The channel gains from the intermediate node T i to destination D and malicious eavesdropper E are g Ti,D and g Ti,E , respectively, i ∈ N .
During the cooperation course, each intermediate node will firstly choose its proper identity, i.e., to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer, mainly according to its own channel conditions. Then, the intermediate nodes are divided into two groups, i.e., the relay group and the jammer group. We denote the relay group and the jammer group by R = {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R t } and J = {J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J l }, respectively, where R ∪ J = T .
Consider a coalition S with only one member T i , T i ∈ T , either a conventional relay or a friendly jammer. Then, from the coalition value defined in (7), we can obtain the self-utility of T i , i.e., the coalition value of S = {T i }, as
In addition, we define a payoff division rule of a coalition, which is to divide the extra utility equally among the members. Thus, the payoff utility of member T i in a coalition S can be given as
where U (T i ) and U (T j ) are the self-utility of intermediate node T i and T j defined in (8 (8), we have that it can get a positive self-utility. If T i chooses to be a friendly jammer, from (8), we have that the self-utility of it is zero, in addition, no one will want to cooperate with it for that with a positive jamming power it can only decrease the 4 secrecy rate achieved by a coalition due to (6) . Therefore, the optimal choice of T i under the channel condition that g Ti,D > g Ti,E is to be a conventional relay. For the case that g Ti,D ≤ g Ti,E , from (8), the self-utility will be zero either T i chooses to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer. However, if T i chooses to be a friendly jammer, it may find some potential partners to form a stronger coalition and get a positive payoff utility from the formed coalition due to (9) for that it can increase the secrecy rate achieved by a coalition with a proper positive jamming power. Therefore, the optimal choice of T i under the channel condition that g Ti,D ≤ g Ti,E is to be a friendly jammer.
B. Property of the Proposed Coalitional Game
Definition 1: A coalitional game (T , v) with transferable utility is said to be superadditive if for any two disjoint coalitions
Property 1: The proposed coalitional game (T , v) is nonsuperadditive.
Proof: Consider two disjoint coalitions S 1 ⊂ T and S 2 ⊂ T in the network with their corresponding utilities v(S 1 ) and v(S 2 ) when they do not cooperate with each other. We assume that there is one node belongs to R in S 1 , which is denoted by R, while all the nodes belong to J in S 2 . Then, we have that ε r = 1 in the coalition value v(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) and v(S 1 ), while v(S 2 ) = 0 as ε r = 0 for the value of coalition S 2 . From the expressions of (6) and (7), when ε r = 1, in our assumptions we have that
+ , where both C R→D (R, {J k }) and C R→E (R, {J k }) are decreasing and convex functions of |S| − 1 which is the number of friendly jammers in the coalition S consisting of relay R and several friendly jammers. However, C R→E (R, {J k }) decreases faster than C R→D (R, {J k }) as the number of friendly jammers in S increases, due to the channel conditions that g J k ,D < g J k ,E , ∀J k ∈ J . Thus, v(S) will increase in some region of |S| − 1. But when |S| − 1 further increases, both C R→D (R, {J k }) and C R→E (R, {J k }) approach zero, as a result, v(S) will approach zero. From the above analysis, we can get that there exists an optimal number of friendly jammers i opt , which can maximize the coalition value v(S). Therefore, in the case that
, which means that the proposed coalitional game is not superadditive. Having defined an imputation, the core can be defined as
In other words, the core is the set of imputations where the players have no incentive to reject the proposed payoff allocation, deviate from the grand coalition T and form a coalition S instead. A non-empty core means that the players have an incentive to form the grand coalition.
Property 2: The core of the proposed coalitional game (T , v) is not always non-empty.
Proof: For this property, we consider a special case that there is only a few conventional relays but a large size of friendly jammers in T , then from the proof to Property 1 we can get that the grand coalition value v(T ) approaches zero due to the high interference of friendly jammers, which will lead to no group rational imputation. Therefore, at least under this case the core of the proposed coalitional game is not nonempty.
Briefly, as a result of the non-superadditivity as well as the possible core's emptiness of the proposed game, the grand coalition of all the intermediate nodes will seldom form. Instead, several intermediate nodes will deviate from the grand coalition and form independent disjoint coalitions. Hence, in the next section, we will devise an algorithm for coalition formation that can characterize these disjoint coalitions.
IV. COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
From the above analysis, we find that disjoint coalitions rather than the grand coalition will form among the cooperative intermediate nodes in most cases. Thus, the proposed game can be classified as a coalition formation game [6] . In this section, using the game theoretical techniques from coalition formation games, we devise a distributed coalition formation algorithm.
A. Coalition Formation Concepts
For constructing a coalition formation process suitable to the proposed game, we require several definitions as follows.
Definition 3: A collection of coalitions, denoted by P, is defined as a set P = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p } of mutually disjoint coalitions S i ⊂ T . In other words, a collection is any arbitrary group of disjoint coalitions S i of T not necessarily spanning all the players of T . If a collection P spans all the players of T , i.e., Various well known orders can be used as comparison relations [11] . There are two main categories of these orders, which are coalition value orders and individual value orders. Coalition value orders compare two collections using the value of the coalitions in these collections such as the utilitarian order in which P L implies
Individual value orders perform the comparison using the individual payoffs of each player such as the Pareto order. Given that two collections P and L have same players and 
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player T k . The Pareto order implies a collection P is preferred to L, if at least one player is able to improve its payoff when the coalition structure changes from P to L without decreasing other players' payoffs. In this cooperative network, different coalitions of conventional relays and friendly jammers not only have chances for cooperation, but also suffer competition from each other as there is only one coalition can be selected by the source and gain the payoff in the end. Two disjoint coalitions are preferred to cooperate with each other if they can form a stronger one instead, as the players of them have more chance to win the payoffs from the source. Here, we concern more about the coalition who has the highest value and whether the players in it can always benefit from a positive payoff. Then, based on the Pareto order described in (11), we define a new comparison relation with respect to our system as follows.
Definition 5: Consider two collections P = {S 1 , . . . , S p } and L = {S * 1 , . . . , S * l } with same players in them. Then, the Max-Pareto order is defined as
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player T j in the individual payoff comparison.
B. Merge-and-Split Coalition Formation Algorithm
Using the coalition formation concepts in the previous subsection, we construct a distributed coalition formation algorithm for self-organization in the cooperative network based on two simple rules denoted as "merge" and "split" which permit to modify a partition of T [11] .
• Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions {S 1 , . . . , S l } whenever the merged form is preferred by the players, i.e., where
• Split Rule: Split any coalition l j=1 S j whenever a split form is preferred by the players, i.e., where
According to the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge into a larger coalition if merging yields a preferred partition based on the Max-Pareto order. This implies that a group of players can agree to form a larger coalition, if the merged coalition has no less value than any of the disjoint coalitions and at least one of the players can improve its payoff without decreasing the utilities of any other player. Similarly, an existing coalition can decide to split to smaller coalitions if splitting yields a preferred partition based on the Max-Pareto order.
As shown in Table I , we construct a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on the merge-and-split rules. The The source transmits its data to the intermediate nodes. Each intermediate node chooses its optimal identity (to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer) based on its channel conditions to the destination and the eavesdropper.
For an intermediate node
, then it will choose to be a conventional relay. Else, it will choose to be a friendly jammer. The intermediate node who cannot decode the source messages correctly has no choice but to be a friendly jammer.
Phase 2 -Adaptive Coalition Formation: Each intermediate node with an identity can be regarded as a disjoint independent coalition, then coalition formation using merge-and-split rules occurs:
− Clock index t = 0. − Repeat (a) Pt = Merge(Tt): coalitions in Tt decide to merge based on the merge rules.
(b) Lt = Split(Pt): coalitions in Pt decide to split based on the split rules.
(c) Update clock index t = t + 1.
Until merge-and-split terminates. − Each coalition reports the secrecy rate of data transmission that it can achieve, i.e, the coalition value as we defined in (7), to the source.
Phase 3 -Secure Transmission:
The source chooses the coalition who can provide the highest secrecy rate for secure data transmission and pays for it.
three phases of the coalition formation algorithm are repeated periodically during the network operation, allowing a topology that is adaptive to environmental changes such as mobility. During the adaptive coalition formation phase, T t denotes the partition of the intermediate nodes set at clock t. The merging operation Merge(T t ) spans all the current coalitions in T t orderly, resulting in a final partition P t at clock t. Following the merge process, the coalitions in the resulting partition P t are next subject to the splitting operation Split(P t ), if any is necessary. The process will be repeated until there is no need for any merging or splitting in the current partition. Note that the merge or split decisions can be taken in a distributed manner by each individual coalition without relying on any centralized entity.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To validate the performances, we conduct the following simulations. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider a cooperative network with a couple of intermediate nodes in a 0.5 × 0.5 square area whose center is (0, 0). Source S, destination D, and eavesdropper E are located at (−2, 0), (2, 0), and (2, −1), respectively. The other simulation parameters are set up as follows: The jamming power of a friendly jammer is p J = 0.1p R , where p R is the transmitting power of a conventional relay; the transmission bandwidth is W = 1; the noise variance is σ 2 = 0.01; Rayleigh fading channel is assumed, where the channel gain consists of both the path loss and the Rayleigh fading coefficient; the path loss factor is 2. In Fig. 2 , we show the network scenarios before and after coalition formation based on our proposed merge-andsplit algorithm. We can see that before coalition formation each intermediate node chooses its optimal identity (to be a conventional relay or a friendly jammer, in the figure represents conventional relay and • represents friendly jammer) according to its own channel conditions to the destination and the eavesdropper. Then, the conventional relays and friendly jammers start to find optimal partners in order to improve the chance to be selected by the source, using the merge-and-split rules to help them make decisions. After the coalition formation process, several disjoint independent coalitions are formed. The coalition with the highest value will be selected by the source for secure data transmission and obtain the payoff it deserves. Overall, this figure shows how the distributed conventional relays and friendly jammers can self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions based on the proposed merge-and-split algorithm. In addition, from the figure, we can find that all the conventional relays will always join in one coalition in the end.
In Fig. 3 , we show the performance in terms of the final secrecy rate for data transmission as a function of the transmitting power p R in two different cases. Here, the centralized relay and jammer selection algorithm is the one proposed as optimal selection with jamming (OSJ) scheme in [10] . The comparison between the two performance results implies the efficiency of our proposed distributed coalition formation algorithm with respect to secure data transmission in a cooperative network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated cooperation of conventional relays and friendly jammers for secure data transmission in a cooperative network. We formulated this cooperation as a coalition formation game with transferable utility and studied some properties of it. Then, we devised a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on the merge-and-split rules. From the simulation results, we can see the efficiency of the proposed merge-and-split coalition formation algorithm. 
